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Frank. William Hausladen, Jr., Pro Se 
Appellant 
516 ½ Oak Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FRANK WILLIAM HAUSLADEN, JR. ) 
) 
Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SHARI COLENE KNOCHE ) 
) 
Defendant, ) 
) 
JOHN H. SAHLIN, ) 
) 
Judgment Creditor on Appeal-Respondent, ) 
S. Ct. No. 40274 
BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR 
REVIEW 
(I.A.R. 118) 
COMES NOW, the above-named Appellant, pursuant to I.A.R. 116 & 42 and 
petitions this Court for a rehearing of the Court of Appeals' ORDER dated October 7, 2013 
and 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 637S dated 12-12-13 (the third substituted opinion). 
FACTORS UNDER I.A.R. 118 THAT ARE PRESENT: 
1. The Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not in accord with 
applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court; 
2. The Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not in accord with the 
Idaho Constitution, Idaho law, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and/or Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
3. The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise the Idaho Supreme Court's power of 
superv1s10n. 
4. The alternative issues on appeal relate to questions of substance not previously 
determined by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Brief in Support of 
Petition for Review 
I.A.R. 118 
OVERVIEW/INTRODUCTION 
The issues set forth herein ask the questions: (I) can an Idaho appellate court 
"deem" itself to reaquire jurisdiction after a remittitur was issued and (2) is a "parenting 
coordinator" still a "parenting coordinator" four ( 4) months after being dismissed by order 
of the magistrate court. The Court of Appeals said "yes" to both questions above even 
though both decisions were clearly outside of the law and contrary to the facts. 
Appellant has one question to the Idaho Supreme Court: Will you correct these 
flagrant "errors" or adopt them as your own through inaction?1 
ISSUES: 
I. The Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to change/alter/amend the substituted opinion 
dated August 27, 2013, cited as 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 673S after September 
17, 2013. 
II. In the alternative, if this Court refuses to set aside the ORDER dated October 7, 2013: 
FACTS 
a. The standing analysis on pages 3 - 4 of Unpublished Opinion No. 673S 
contains a mistake in law and fact as John Sahlin: 
1. was not a Parenting Coordinator (as required in LR.C.P. 16(1) 
and LC. Section 32-717D) at the relevant time, and 
11. did not file a motion for fees (as required in LR.C.P. 16(1) and 
LC. Section 32-717D) and therefore lacked standing to pursue 
his cause of action in this case; 
b. Sahlin was not the prevailing party, Hausladen was the prevailing party 
and is entitled to costs pursuant to LA.R. 40. 
(1) The Idaho Court of Appeals issued an opinion that "reversed and remanded" the 
issue on appeal to the district court and awarded "costs to Sahlin" on 8-23-13. 
1 The standing issue has been ignored up until the Court of Appeals "deemed" Sahlin was a "parenting 
coordinator" even after he was dismissed by court order. If the standing issue is not properly addressed by 
this Court, the Court will be presented with the issue in the near future as it is doubtful the Kootenai County 
district court will acknowledge the issue's existence. 
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(2) On or about 8-23-13, Appellant called the Supreme Court Clerk's office an 
inquired whether the award of costs to Sahlin was an error since the district 
court's ruling was "reversed and remanded" and Sahlin was not the Appellant. 
The employee at the Supreme Court Clerk's office assured Hausladen that the 
issue would be looked into and a substitute opinion would be issued if the cost 
award was an error/mistake. 
(3) On 8-27-13, the Idaho Court of Appeals issued a substitute opm1on which 
mirrored the 8-23-13 opinion except for award of costs was changed from Sahlin 
to Hausladen. Hausladen/ Appellant filed a memorandum of costs on or about 8-
28-13. 
(4) On 8-28-13, Appellant mailed his Memorandum of Costs to the Idaho Court of 
Appeals which disclosed costs in the amount of$987.81. 
(5) On or about 9-6-2013, Sahlin filed (mailed) an "OBJECTION TO AWARD OF 
COSTS ON APPEAL." In the first paragraph of said document, Sahlin cited that 
said document was filed "[p ]ursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40( d)" but was 
essentially an argument that Hausladen was not the prevailing party and should 
not have been awarded costs. 
( 6) On or about 9-16-13 Appellant mailed ( which was apparently received by the 
Court of Appeals on 9-18-13) an objection to Sahlin's Objection to Award of 
Costs which stated that Sahlin was required to physically file a Petition for 
Rehearing (with the $71.00 filing fee) within 21 days of the publish date of the 
substitute opinion. Since Sahlin had not done this, all of his arguments were moot 
and Appellant was entitled to all costs set forth in his Memorandum of Costs 
(987.81). 
(7) Pursuant to LA.R.122 & 38(b), the substitute op1mon dated 8-27-13 which 
"awarded costs to Hausladen" became "final" on 9-17-13. 
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(8) On 9-18-13, the Remittitur was issued which included: "IT IS HEREBY 
FURTHER ORDERED that Sahlin's costs on appeal will be addressed in a 
subsequent order."2 
(9) Chief Justice Gutierrez issued an "ORDER" on 9-20-13 (apparently in response to 
Appellant's brief filed on or about September 16, 2013) stating that the Court of 
Appeals was "treat[ing]" Sahlin's "OBJECTION TO A WARD OF COSTS ON 
APPEAL" as a petition for rehearing on the question of the "prevailing party." 
The "ORDER" is silent as to the legal basis for the holding. 
(10) On or about 10-3-13, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss (Sahlin's 
"deemed" Petition for Rehearing) & Objection to 9-20-13 Order. Appellant 
argued that Chief Judge Gutierrez's order was void for lack of jurisdiction.3 
(11) On 10-7-13, Chief Judge Gutierrez issued another order (apparently in 
response to Appellant's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Rehearing) which did not 
directly acknowledged Appellant's legal arguments but "withdrew" its 9-20-13 
order and dismissed Appellant's Motion to Dismiss because it was now "moot". 
The Court of Appeals also "withdrew" the Remittitur dated 9-16-13 and reissued 
its original opinion dated 8-23-13 and denied Hausladen's Memorandum of Costs. 
The October 7, 2013 Order failed to cite any authority or legal basis for its 
holding. 
(12) Thereafter Appellant timely filed (and paid the $71.00 filing fee) a 
Petitioner for Rehearing and a Petition for Review. 
(13) Although the Court of Appeals somehow "resurrected" jurisdiction over 
this issue on appeal, the Kootenai County District Court has done the following 
since the case was "recalled" back to the Court of Appeals: 
a. On 10-23-13, District Judge Rich Christiansen (who replaced Judge Luster 
who was on the appeal) filed a disqualification; 
2 Appellant does not know if this was a mistake/clerical error but it obviously conflicts with the "final" 
substitute opinion issued by the Court since costs were awarded to Hausladen. 
3 Appellant argued that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction since no action was taken by the Court of 
Appeals within 2 I days of the date of the substituted order, Sahlin had failed to file a Petition for 
Rehearing, Sahlin had failed to pay the required $71.00 filing fee (at all let alone timely). 
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b. On 10-24-13, District Judge John Mitchell was appointed in the case; and 
c. ON 11-5-2013, District Judge Mitchell issued "Order for Hearing and 
Setting of Briefing Schedule on Administrative Appeal". 
(14) On December 12, 2013, the Court of Appeals issued an order denying Appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing and issued a substitute opinion that changed (for the third time) the 
award of costs to neither party.4 
LAW & ANALYSIS 
I. The Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to change/alter/amend the substituted 
opinion dated August 27, 2013, cited as 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 673S 
after September 1 7, 2013. 
Under Idaho law, the Court of Appeals does not retain 
authority/power/jurisdiction over a case forever. As set forth in the rules5, 21 days after 
the issuance of the substituted order, the Court of Appeals automatically, by law, loses 
authority/power/jurisdiction over a case. After the 21 days have expired, both Appellant 
and Respondent are barred from changing the decision.6 Likewise, the Court of Appeals 
is barred from changing the outcome of the case (modifying its opinion). 
Pursuant to I.AR. 38, the substituted opinion dated 8-27-13 became "final" 
twenty-one (21) days after it was issued. By law, the substituted opinion could not be 
altered, amended or changed after 9-1 7-13. 
The Chief Justice's order dated 9-20-13 "deemed" Sahlin's objection to the award 
of costs to be a petition for rehearing and inherently "deemed" that the required $71.00 
filing fee was paid timely. As the facts obviously show, neither happened. Following 
Appellant's objections to the 9-20-13 order, the Chief Justice changed the "reason" for 
exercising jurisdiction (after the remittitur was issued) with the same result - changing 
the award of costs (prevailing party). Although the 10-7-13 order attempts to justify its 
actions because an "error" occurred, nothing was disclosed earlier about an "error" - the 
4 Costs were originally awarded to Sahlin, then to Hausladen, then back to Sahlin, now to neither party. 
5 See I.A.R. 38. 
6 By filing either a Petition for Rehearing or a Petition for Review - see I.A.R. 21 & 42. 
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Court of Appeals tried to allow Sahlin to appeal the prevailing party analysis without 
timely filing a Petition for Review and timely paying a $71.00 filing fee. Only after 
Appellant filed to dismiss the "deemed" Petition for Review did the Court of Appeals 
attempt to justify its extra-jurisdictional reach because of an "error". If an "error" had 
actually occurred the Court of Appeals would have issued an order similar to the 10-07-
13 order on 9-20-13 ( called the alleged "error" and "error" first instead of a "deemed" 
petition for review and a $71.00 to be paid when it was not). On December 12, 2013, the 
(third) substitute opinion has now changed the "prevailing party" analysis again. The 
Court of Appeals' own orders/opinions clearly illustrate that it merely kept changing its 
mind on an issue (which is not a legitimate reason for "recalling" a remittitur as set 
forth in the case below). 
The rules set forth above regarding time limits for filing a petition for review 
and/or petition for rehearing and remittitur are JURISDICTIONAL in nature and are set 
in stone. Just like when a notice of appeal is not timely filed, it is jurisdictional in 
nature.7 Cases such as State v. Hartwig,8 State v. Iverson,9State v. Johnson, 10 Lohman v. 
State, 11 and Amboh are just a few cases that illustrate lack of jurisdiction issues on 
appeal/remand. When an appellate court loses jurisdiction of a case it cannot (legally) be 
recalled since the appellate court lacks the power/authority/jurisdiction to do so. 
I.AR. 101 12 requires three (3) judges to constitute a quorum and two (2) must 
concur to pronounce a decision or render an opinion. It appears that both the 9-20-13 
Order and the 10-7-13 order also violates this rule as only Chief Judge Gutierrez is 
attempting to change the substituted opinion by himself. Clearly, the law (rules) do not 
allow one judge to unilaterally change the opinion of a quorum. 
I.A.R. 112 states that "[a]ll opinions, decisions, orders and remittiturs of the Court 
of Appeals shall be as prescribed by the Idaho Appellate Rules." I.A.R. 122 further states 
7 See Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650. 
8 150 Idaho 326 (20 I l ). 
9 79 fdaho 25 (1957). 
10 75 Idaho 157 (1954). 
11 138 Idaho l (2002). 
12 See also: Idaho Constitution Article V, Section 2; I.C. Section 1-2403, 1-2407, 1-2408 and l-2409. 
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that opinions and remittiturs must be issued in accordance to I.A.R. 38 unless a petition 
for review is granted by the Supreme Court and the assignment to the Court of Appeals 
will terminate and no remittitur shall issue on the opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to modify the terms (such as changing 
the prevailing party) of the substituted opinion dated 8-27-13 and lacked jurisdiction to 
"withdraw" a remittitur under these circumstances and re-exercise jurisdiction over this 
case. The orders dated 9-20-13 and 10-7-13 are void for lack of jurisdiction. 
The Court should have realized this basic, fundamental jurisdictional "problem" 
prior to issuing the 9-20-13 Order. "The question of jurisdiction is fundamental and 
cannot be ignored. Even if jurisdictional questions are not raised by the parties, the 
Court must address them on its own initiative." 13 (emphasis added). "Even if 
jurisdictional questions are not raised by the parties, we are obligated to address them, 
when applicable, on our own initiative. . . "Further, parties cannot confer jurisdiction 
upon the court by stipulation, agreement or estoppel."14 Cases such as Amboh v. State, 
149 Idaho 650 (Ct.App. 2012) and State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326 (2010) demonstrate 
that appeal filing deadlines are absolute and failure to comply result in dismissal ( even in 
criminal cases where an individual's freedom is at stake). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals did not substitute/modify/republish the August 27, 
2013 substitute opinion. Therefore, on September 17, 2013, the conclusions set forth in 
the August 27, 2013, substitute opinion (including "costs to Hausladen") become 
irrevocable and, in essence, "written in stone." Neither Appellant or Respondent has the 
ability to modify its contents by filing a petition for rehearing and/or a petition for review 
with the Supreme Court. Likewise, the issuing court is bound by the appellate rules and 
jurisdictional limitations and is barred from modifying an opinion once it has 
automatically become "final." 
13 Diamond v. Sandpoint Title Insurance, 132 Idaho 145, 148 (1998) citing H & V Eng'g, Inc. v. Idaho 
State Bd. Of Prof! Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, I 13 Idaho 646, 747 P.2d 55, 57 (1987). 
14 H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State B. of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 
648 ( 1987). SEE ALSO these additional cases that more specifically analyze jurisdictional issues on 
appeal: State v. Iverson, 79 Idaho 25 (1957), State v. Johnson, 75 Idaho 157 (1954), Lohman v. State, 138 
Idaho l (2002). 
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Pursuant to IAR 38(b), twenty-one (21) days after the announcement of the 
substitute opinion (September 17, 2013), the substitute opinion "automatically" became 
final (including the award of costs to Hausladen) under the appellate rules. On 
September 18, 2013, the Court of Appeals issued the remittitur with the caveat that" ... 
Sahlin's costs on appeal will be addressed in a subsequent order."15 The "catch 22" at 
this point is that the Court of Appeals has already awarded costs to Hausladen and 
following the remittitur, has no jurisdiction over that issue other than awarding or not 
awarding costs to Hausladen pursuant to IAR 42 (any costs not specifically allowed 
under IAR 42 are denied and all costs specifically set forth in IAR 42 are awarded). 
As set forth above, nothing in the Idaho Appellate Rules allows a remittitur to be 
"recalled" and caselaw on the issue is very limited in scope. 
There appears to be one Idaho Supreme Court case relating to this issue: State v. 
Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623 (1921 ), the Idaho Supreme Court recalled a remittitur for the first 
time and stated: "The questions involved here are of the utmost importance to appellant, 
and every consideration of justice demands that this court determine its power to both 
recall remittitur and to reduce the punishment in this case, and the punishment be reduced 
if the facts do not warrant the imposition of the death penalty." Id at 631. The court 
further reasoned: "We have, therefore, after very careful consideration, reached the 
conclusion that it is our duty to recall the remittitur, and to modify the judgment to the 
extent that the sentence to be inflicted be that of life imprisonment at hard labor in lieu of 
inflicting the death penalty, and the judgment is so modified. Id at 637-38. In short, the 
Idaho Supreme Court recalled a remittitur in order to save a person's life. 16 
Other states have allowed a remittitur to be recalled but only under very, very 
special circumstances. In California: 
Other than for the correction of clerical errors, the recall may be 
ordered on the ground of fraud, mistake or inadvertence. The recall 
may not be granted to correct judicial error . . .[A] decision is 
inadvertent if it is the result of oversight, neglect or accident, as 
15 It is assumed that this was a typographical error since the substitute opinion awarded costs to Hausladen. 
16 Pursuant to LC. Section 19-2821, the Idaho Supreme Court was empowered to do so (alter a sentence) 
uni! 1977 when said statute was repealed by the Idaho Legislature. 
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distinguished from judicial error." (Southwest Inv. Corp. v. City of 
L.A. (1952) 38 Cal.2d 623,626,241 P.2d 985.)17 
In Wisconsin: 
There is no equivalent to Wis. Stat. (Section) 806.07(1)(a) in the 
rules of appellate procedure for either the court of appeals or this 
court. W agree with the court of appeals that as the rules of appellate 
procedure are currently constituted, an appellate court's jurisdiction 
over a cause ceases upon remittitur in the absence of inadvertence, 
fraud, or a void judgment. Wis Stat. [Section] 809.26; State v. 
American TV and Appliance of Madison, Inc., 151 Wis.2d 175, 178-
80, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989).18 
In Missouri: 
Ordinarily, when a court has jurisdiction to render a judgment 
which is not the result of fraud, imposition or prejudicial mistakes of 
facts, a remittitur which has been duly issued thereon may not be 
recalled or quashed to correct mere errors of law or procedure. 
Whenever the judgment of an appellate court impinges upon the 
federal constitution~( rights of the accused, however, the mistake 
cannot be said to be a 'mere [error] of law or procedure.' 
Consequently, our courts have properly recognized that a mandate 
may be recalled in order to remedy a desrivation of the federal 
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant. 
Other states, such as Georgia,20 Maine,21 New Mexico22, Washington,23, and 
Oklahoma24 have almost the same "rule" (via caselaw). 
In this case, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion that "reversed and remanded" 
the district court's dismissal of appellant's appeal from district court and awarded costs to 
Sahlin (the respondent). Within a week thereafter, the Court of Appeals substituted its 
17 Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com., 188 Cal.Rptr. I 04, I 08,655 P.2d 306 (Cal. 1982). 
18 State ex rel. Fuentes v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV, 593 N.W.2d 48, 51, 225 Wis.2d 446 
(Wis. 1999). 
19 State v. Thompson, 659 S.W. 2d 766, 768-769 (Mo. 1983). 
20 See Davidson v. Calllaway. 559 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. 2002). 
21 See Tyson v. Whitaker & Son, Inc., 411 A.2d 389 {Me., 1980). 
22 See Woodson v. Lee. 74 N.M. 227 {N.M. 1964). 
23 See Hong v. Washington State Health, 192 P.3d 21 {Wa.App. 2008) 
24 See L'ggrke v. Sherman, 223 P.3d 383 {Ok 2009). 
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original opm1on and changed the award of costs "to Hausladen" (appellant). After 
remittitur was issued, the Idaho Court of Appeals decided to "treat" Sahlin's objection to 
the award or costs as a "Petition for Rehearing." Following Appellant's motion to 
dismiss25 the "deemed" "Petition for Rehearing", the Court of Appeals then issued an order 
and "deemed" the remittitur to be recalled. The Court of Appeals then corrected what it 
termed simply as an "error" and changed the cost award back "to Sahlin." The Court of 
Appeals then changed the award of costs for the third time to "no costs to either party." 
Although, as the cases above show, "error" is not a legally recognized reason to recall a 
remittitur26, "error" was not the reason in this case either since the Court of Appeals "re-
corrected" the "corrected error" in its 12-12-2013 third substituted opinion. The Court of 
Appeals merely kept changing its mind on the award of costs and its remand of the 
remittitur was void for lack of jurisdiction and the original substituted opinion of the award 
of costs "to Hausladen" must be reinstated. 
II. In the alternative, if this Court refuses to set aside the ORDER dated October 7, 
2013: 
a. The standing analysis on pages 3 - 4 of Unpublished Opinion No. 673S (the 
third substituted opinion dated 12-12-13) contains a mistake in law and fact 
as John Sahlin: 
1. was not a Parenting Coordinator (as required in I.R.C.P. 16(1) and 
I.C. Section 32-717D), and 
11. did not file a motion for fees (as required in I.R.C.P. 16(1) and LC. 
Section 32-717D) and therefore lacked standing to pursue his cause 
of action in this case; 
25 Since respondent Sahlin never filed said petition and never paid the REQUIRED filing fee and the Court 
of Appeals AUTOMATICALLY lost jurisidiction over the case. 
26 See Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com., 188 Cal.Rptr. 104, 108,655 P.2d 306 (Cal. 
1982) cited above. 
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The Court of Appeals properly analyzed that Sahlin has never been a "party" to 
this action in the substitute opinion. However, the Court of Appeals incorrectly found 
that Sahlin was a "parenting coordinator" when presenting his "claim" and that Sahlin 
properly presented his "claim".27 
Therefore, in order to take part in this case, John Sahlin must be a "parenting 
coordinator" (as defined in LC. Section 32-717D) and properly present his claim as set 
forth in LC. Section 32-717D and/or LR.C.P. 16(1). 
However, the Court of Appeals failed to recognize the fact that John Sahlin was 
not a Parenting Coordinator at the relevant time.28 John Sahlin's position of Parenting 
Coordinator was terminated by Judge Watson at a hearing on 12-30-05. In an order dated 
1-11-06,29 Judge Watson wrote: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that John Sahlin's 
appointment as Parenting Coordinator is terminated as of December 30, 2005." John 
Sahlin filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause and for Entry of Judgment and Notice of 
Hearing30 and a supporting Affidavit31 on May 17,2006 5 ½ months AFTER his 
appointment was terminated. 
As set forth above, John Sahlin was not a "parenting coordinator" after 12-30-05. 
Judge Watson terminated all ties John Sahlin had with this case on 12-30-05. "Special 
intervention status" is only reserved for a "parenting coordinator". As of May 17, 2006, 
John Sahlin had no legal ties to this case and therefore clearly had no standing to 
intervene. 
27 The Court of Appeal's analysis ASSUMED Sahlin was a "parenting coordinator" when he filed his 
request which the appellate record CLEARLY shows he was not and Sahlin filed a MOTION FOR 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE as a "pleading." 
28 The Court of Appeals changed the plain, ordinary meaning of Idaho Code Section 32-717D (by allowing 
an individual who clearly was not a "parenting coordinator" to be "treated" as a "parenting coordinator" for 
purposes of collecting fees) and violates Article II, Section l of the Idaho Constitution. "It is the duty of 
the legislature to make laws and the duty of the court to construe them and, if a law as construed by the 
court is to be changed, that is a legislative, not judicial function." In re Speer, 53 Idaho 292 (1933). 
29 Clerk's Record, S. Ct. Docket No. 40274-2012, Vol. I, page 138. 
3° Clerk's Record, S. Ct. Docket No. 40274-2012, Vol. I, page 148. 
31 Clerk's Record, S. Ct. Docket No. 40274-2012, Vol. I, page 150. 
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John Sahlin clearly did not file a "motion for fees" or anything similar thereto.32 
His "pleadings" amounted to a defective motion for order to show cause in which no 
order to show cause was issued. Even if Sahlin had been a "parenting coordinator" at the 
time he filed said documents, he clearly did not have standing to file a motion for order to 
show cause since he was not a party to the action. Most importantly, Sahlin even failed 
to state what rule his motion was based upon as required by I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l).33 As set 
forth in Appellant's prior briefing (incorporated herein by reference) Appellant objected 
to this "motion" going forward and continued to object throughout the appeal process and 
this "standing"34 issue was just ignored. Finally, the Court of Appeals noticed the issue 
but ignored the plain fact that Sahlin was not a "parenting coordinator" AND failed to file 
the proper documentation (follow the specific procedures). Two major reasons why 
Sahlin had no standing, either of which is fatal to Sahlin's cause. 
As stated before, Sahlin's actions go beyond the actions of Ken Adler in the 
Abolafia35 case at least Adler appeared to be taking action on behalf of the children (his 
argument) whereas Sahlin was merely trying a shortcut method for collecting money for 
ultra vires acts. No matter how you analyze it, Sahlin has been nothing more than an 
"officious intermeddler" in this case since his termination on December 30, 2005. 
As required by law, the Court must dismiss Sahlin's "cause of action" since he 
lacked standing (on multiple levels) to pursue his "claim" in this case. 
As set forth above, jurisdictional matters may be brought up for the first time on 
appeal, Appellant's stance has been consistent on this issue throughout the long history of 
this case: Sahlin has no standing to pursue a claim in a custody case which Sahlin is not 
a party and not a parenting coordinator. This was argued before the "trial" ( a hearing on 
32 Clerk's Record, S. Ct. Docket No. 40274-2012, Vol. I, page 148 - 151 - NOTE: Sahlin failed to even 
set forth a statute or rule 
33 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(l) requires that: An application to the court for an order shall be by 
motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity 
the grounds therefore including the number of the applicable civil rule, ... [emphasis added). 
34 As set forth above and Appellant's prior briefing, even if Appellant failed to properly object (which he 
has) the Court, on its own initiative must investigate the "standing problem" since it is jurisdictional in 
nature. 
35 Abolafia v. Reeves, 152 Idaho 898, 902 (2012). 
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Sahlin' s motion for order to show cause )36 commenced; on appeal in the district court; 
on appeal in the Idaho Court of Appeals; on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court; on 
remand in the magistrate court when it wrongfully exercised authority over the case and 
attempted to "retry" the case (Judge Peterson); in district court (Judge Simpson and Judge 
Luster) when said court transferred the case to magistrate court for a "determination" 
before said court made a "deterrnination"37; in magistrate court (Judge Stow) when it 
improperly exercised jurisdiction over the matter on remand; and finally on appeal to the 
district court (Judge Luster) when said court wrongfully dismissed the appeal which is 
currently the issue in this Court. At some point, Appellant hopes that a court will 
recognize that a former Parenting Coordinator is legally barred from intervening in a 
custody case after his appointment has been terminated and a magistrate court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear a former Parenting Coordinator's motion for order to show cause. 
b. Sahlin was not the prevailing party, Hausladen was the prevailing party and 
is entitled to costs pursuant to LA.R. 40. 
"The" issue on appeal was that the Appellant's appeal in district court was 
wrongfully dismissed. Appellant further argued that the whole case should be dismissed 
due to several jurisdictional and procedural "problems" that have been raised by Appellant 
over and over again only to be ignored. As analyzed above, Sahlin did not "win" the 
standing issue because the Court of Appeals did not properly analyze it. Sahlin was not a 
parenting coordinator and did not file a motion to determine fees and, therefore, did not 
have standing to take part in this litigation. 
Irregardless, the analysis set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Ranch v. Nord 
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716 (2005), sets forth the proper prevailing party 
analysis: " ... the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall 
view, not a claim-by-claim analysis." 38(emphasis added). In this case Appellant presented 
three (2) basic arguments, one for dismissal based on jurisdiction/procedure (with two(2) 
36 Clerk's Record, S. Ct. Docket No. 40274-2012, Vol. 1, page 199. 
37 Even though the Idaho Supreme Court order the district court to make the "determination." 
38 Ranch at 133. 
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subparts) and the main argument for reversal of the district court's wrongful dismissal of 
the appeal. As argued above, the Sahlin lacks standing and his claim should be dismissed. 
In its original (and substituted) opinion, the Court of Appeals "reversed and remanded" the 
case to district court - looking at the appeal "from an overall view" Appellant is the 
prevailing party. 
Sahlin filed nothing in the district court when Judge Luster was attempting to 
dismiss Appellant's appeal. Obviously, the reasons for dismissal of Appellant's appeal 
were ridiculous Sahlin had no real option other than to agree with Appellant in the Court 
of Appeals - the law is clear on the issue. But Sahlin's acquiescence was too late he 
waited to change his position until AFTER Appellant was forced to pay a $109.00 filing 
fee, pay $560 for the clerk's record and invest a substantial amount of time and effort in 
briefing this issue. Sahlin's "noble" action of "agreeing" with Appellant came only after 
Sahlin did not benefit from the district court's wrongful dismissal of Appellant's appeal 
AND after Appellant was forced to pay substantial money and effort to have his appeal 
reinstated. Sahlin's actions equate with a defendant agreeing to liability right before the 
jury comes back with the verdict - it is too late. Sahlin should not be allowed to "hedge his 
bets" in this manner - he changed sides too late - after Appellant was forced to incur the 
costs associated with the appeal. 
The big question is: Would Sahlin have been the "prevailing party" if the district 
court's holding was not reversed and remanded? Of course he would have - in that 
instance, as the Respondent (with no cross-appeals) he would be the "prevailing party". So 
how can Sahlin be even in the running for the award of costs {as a Respondent with no 
cross-appeals) when the issue on appeal is "reversed and remanded." Ranch and 
subsequent cases39 hold that Appellant, on an overall view, is the prevailing party for 
purposes of costs. 
39 See also: Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic,152 Idaho 540 (2012), Hardenbrook v. UPS, D.C. No. l:07-ev-
00509-ELJ-CWD (9th Cir. 2012); Advanced Medical Diagnostics v. Imaging Center of Idaho, 2013 
Opinion No. 71 (S. Ct. 2013). 
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CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, the Court of Appeals lacks the authority/power/jurisdiction to 
change an opinion after said court's jurisdiction is transferred back to the district court. 
The substituted opinion dated 8-27-13 which awarded costs to Hausladen remains as the 
"final" opinion of the Court of Appeals as the Court of Appeals' orders dated 9-20-13 
and 10-7-13 are void for lack of jurisdiction. Hausladen was awarded costs in what is 
now the '"final" opinion of this Court and timely filed a memorandum of costs, all of 
which fit squarely within the requirements of I.A.R. 40. Hausladen is entitled to costs in 
the amount of $987.81. 
In the alternative (if the Court fails to find the 9-20-13 and 10-7-13 orders void) 
Sahlin lacked standing to take part in a custody case AFTER he was dismissed as a 
parenting coordinator, therefore, Sahlin's claims are dismissed and costs are awarded to 
Hausladen as the prevailing party on appeal. 
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